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  Abstract 
Project organization is used extensively to promote creativity, innovation, and 
responsiveness to local context, but can lead to precarious employment. This paper 
compares European Social Fund (ESF)-supported projects supporting ‘active inclusion’ of 
disadvantaged clients in Slovenia and France. Despite many similarities between the two 
social protection fields in task, temporality, teams, and socio-economic context, the projects 
had different dynamics with important implications for workers. In Slovenia project 
dynamics have been precarious, leading to insecure jobs and reduced status for front-line 
staff; in France, by contrast, projects and employment have been relatively stable. Our 
explanation highlights the transaction, more specifically, the capacity of government 
agencies to function as intermediaries managing the transactions through which ESF money 
is disbursed to organizations providing services. We find that transnational pressures on the 
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state affect its capacity as a transaction organizer to stabilize the organizational field. In 
Slovenia, transnational pressures associated with austerity and EU integration have stripped 
away this capacity more radically than in France, leading to precarious project dynamics 




Projects and precarity 
This paper examines project organization in social services. Often studied in high-tech, 
media, professional services, construction, and infrastructure sectors (Sydow et al, 2004; 
Bakker et al, 2013; 2016), projects have become common in government-funded social 
services. The shift toward project work with clearly defined ‘time, task, and team’, known 
as ‘projectification’ (Lundin et al, 2015; Munck and Wolf, 2017; Godenhjelm et al, 2015), 
has consequences for workers, including legitimizing ‘extreme work’ characterized by job 
insecurity and long hours (Peticca-Harris et al, 2015). Precarious work, defined as work 
that shifts risks onto workers (Kalleberg, 2009), is a growing problem in Europe well 
beyond social services (Doellgast et al 2018) that projectification may exacerbate. 
Organization studies has only begun to examine the effects of projectification on workers 
(Lundin et al, 2015), with projects in social services attracting little attention.  
Social service projectification has not produced a uniform trend toward precarity, 
but the reasons for variation are poorly understood. To address this gap, we examine social 
services in two countries funded by the European Social Fund (ESF). In line with ESF 
requirements, this work is projectified, with clearly defined timelines, teams, and, tasks, the 
latter aimed at integrating marginalized individuals into society by improving their labor 
market access, a policy agenda called ‘active inclusion’ (Zimmermann, 2016; Keune and 
Payton, 2017).  
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We compare France and Slovenia because we observe a puzzling difference. Project 
dynamics exhibit greater precarity in Slovenia than France (Samaluk, 2017; Schulte et al, 
forthcoming). The risks of project failure in Slovenia are shifted onto workers through job 
insecurity and weakening professional status.  
This difference is puzzling, because these countries have numerous institutional 
similarities. Organizations in the French and Slovenian social protection fields1 fulfil 
similar tasks, partly due to the shared funding stream, the ESF. As Eurozone members, 
however, these countries face an austere macro-economic environment that limits social 
spending (Blyth 2013), making resources scarce for social service providers. Both countries 
have developed strong social work institutions, which in Slovenia continued under 
socialism (Zaviršek, 2008). They have a family resemblance as ‘Bismarck-type’ welfare 
states. Unlike ‘Beveridge-type’ systems such as Britain, these two governments have 
lacked a monopoly over service provision and funding (Palier, 2010), and unlike other 
postsocialist countries, Slovenia has retained corporatist governance of work and welfare 
(Bohle and Greskovits, 2008). The importance of skilled social workers, nonprofit service 
                                                          
1 This denotes a subset of social services that assists vulnerable groups often by attempting to 
overcome clients’ social marginalization. In Slovenia this field is called socialno varstvo and in 
France insertion sociale. ‘Active inclusion’ is part of a broader shift in the task in a work-first 
direction: prioritising moving jobless people into, or closer to, paid work.  
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providers, and corporatist governance are among the reasons why work-first social policies 
have had comparatively weak traction in both countries.  
What explains the emergence of a precarious projectariat in Slovenian social 
services but not their French equivalents? Our explanation highlights transactions, whereby 
a service provider delivers a service in exchange for money from a public funder (Le 
Grand, 2003). States – including elected officials and public administration – act to 
structure organizational fields, especially in social services (Van Gestel and Hillebrand, 
2011). The provider organization is usually a public-sector or non-profit agency employing 
staff to carry out project tasks. Where providers are outside the public sector, the state’s 
main tool for structuring this field is the transaction: it defines tendering processes, selects 
providers, monitors performance, and pays providers. The relationship among funders and 
providers varies widely. They can take the form of non-hierarchical local networks, market-
like price-based competition, tight state administrative control, or a combination (Jantz et al 
2018; Greer et al 2017). In the EU the organization of transaction in social services is 
further complicated by EU governing mechanisms demanding fiscal discipline and specific 
policy approaches supported through ESF projects.  
Empirically, this paper contributes to the literature on projectification by exploring a 
new context, the social protection field in two EU countries, and examining a key problem 
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raised in organization studies literature: the precarity (or stability) of project dynamics. Our 
main theoretical contribution to this literature is to specify the organization of the 
transaction as a critical factor shaping the organizational fields in which projects are 
situated. The state’s ability to stabilize this organizational field depends on its capacity to 
organize transactions. In Europe, this capacity has transnational influences, including 
austerity and European integration. Differences in this capacity explain the differing 
precarity of project dynamics and the degree to which projects shift risks onto project 
workers. 
The next sections present our theoretical and methodological approach, 
contextualising our empirical investigation. Then we present our empirical cases, showing 
how in Slovenia, austerity and EU integration pressures reduced the state’s organizing 
capabilities, forcing hurried changes in response to ESF conditionality, leading to greater 
project precarity. In France, transactions evolved through long-standing cooperation 
between public funders and local providers, which stabilized the organizational field and 
protected project workers. We conclude with implications for the literature on 
projectification and some potential implications for two branches of institutional theory that 
have shaped organization studies debates on projects, namely transaction-cost economics 




The consequences of projectification in social services 
‘Projectification’ describes a trend toward clearly defined tasks and worker roles and 
explicit temporariness. Midler (1995) coined the term to describe a shift toward project 
work in a large firm, and others adapted it to the public sector context (Godenhjelm et al, 
2015; Munck and Wolf, 2017). In social services, project dynamics are often precarious, 
leading to heightened insecurity and weakened professional status for workers. Why is this? 
Organization studies writers have developed sophisticated explanations referring to task, 
temporality, roles, and local or national socioeconomic context (Bakker et al, 2016; 
Bechky, 2006; Christopherson, 2002; Whitley, 2006). But in social services these 
parameters are themselves shaped by the actions of the government funder, a ‘project 
organizer’ (Sydow et al, 2004) whose importance stems from organizing the transaction – 
what we call a ‘transaction organizer’. In this section we review literature on precarity in 
social services, evaluating possible explanations from organization studies and outlining 
our explanation centered on the transaction. 
 
 Project organization and precarity in social services in Europe 
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The justifications for project organization in social services are similar to those in the 
private sector: the need for innovation, context-responsiveness, and flexible resource 
deployment (Sundin et al 2015; Munck and Wolf, 2017). Many countries organize social 
services as projects, receiving also temporary and conditional ESF funding  to address 
specific needs (Finn, 2015; Fretel, 2008). Following the EU’s definition of ‘active 
inclusion’ developed for the current program of ESF funding, the organizational field of 
social protection should aim at ‘enabling every citizen, notably the most disadvantaged, to 
fully participate in society, including having a job’.2  
What is the organizational field of social protection? The exact task involved can 
vary from US or British ‘workfare’ schemes that punitively enforce short-term employment 
goals to the French and Slovenian models, where job placement is typically a long-term 
aspiration rather than a short-term target. The organizations also vary from the large for-
profit government outsourcing generalists dominant in Britain, to the large church-affiliated 
nonprofits that run hospitals, nursing homes, and other social services in Germany, to the 
small and mostly local nonprofits specializing in holistic services for particular client 
groups that we observe in France and Slovenia.  




The ‘active inclusion’ task arguably suits project organizing, as a detailed 
government intervention in a rapidly changing context, where policymakers have little a 
priori knowledge of implementation by front-line workers in provider organizations 
(Rothstein, 1998). Policymakers may use projects because they assume permanent public 
sector institutions to be inflexible or refuse long-term financing of schemes with uncertain 
outcomes. The ESF reinforces project organization in the social protection field by 
requiring fixed-term funding agreements.  
Project teams mainly include professionals with a social work ethos and extensive 
task discretion. This reflects the complexity and unpredictability of cases (Lipsky, 1980) 
and institutional factors like the longstanding tendency in many countries to delegate social 
services to nonprofits (Fretel, 2008). While these organizations lack traditions of lifetime 
employment, non-profits still generally offer more stability for staff than for-profits (Greer 
et al, 2017). 
Employment relations literature shows that project dynamics matter for social 
service workers. Compared to counterparts in permanent public-sector organizations, 
workers in outsourced public services face job insecurity, work intensification, and 
diminished institutional protections (Baines, 2004; Cunningham et al, 2011). Outsourcing 
and privatization can increase pressure on staff to hit targets, reducing service quality for 
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clients with complex needs (Baines, 2004; Greer et al, forthcoming). These pressures can 
devalue social service professionals, making them replaceable by lower-paid workers with 
weaker qualifications (Ranald, 2002). They become ‘precarious’ in that they bear the risks 
of project failure more than traditional public-sector workers. 
In Europe, the field of social protection is profoundly affected by transnational 
factors. Austerity is among the policies EU institutions and states deployed following the 
2008 crisis (Umney et al forthcoming). It has had a profound effect on these services, by 
prolonging the crisis and by restricting government debt that could have funded services to 
address the resulting social needs (Blyth, 2013). 
These services are also affected by the redistribution of authority by the EU from 
member states, upwards (to the European Commission) and downwards (to municipalities 
and regions) (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). As the main EU resource for these services, ESF 
match-funds initiatives that fit its defined policy framework (Verschraegen et al, 2011). It 
has evolved into a ‘multifaceted governance instrument’ that uses funding conditionality to 
advance agendas like active inclusion, which may be unfamiliar or unpopular at national 
level (Zimmermann, 2016). Conditionality and surveillance of countries’ fund usage has 
intensified post-crisis (Huguenot-Noel et al, 2017). Samaluk (2017) shows that in Slovenia, 
ESF conditionality has led to the downloading of risk onto front-line project workers.  
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The impact of EU conditionality, however, varies widely, reflecting (among other 
things) political concerns and national fiscal situations (Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2017). The 
concrete meaning of ‘activation’, for example, varies. Under rightwing governments in 
Britain since 2010, the ESF has supported the Work Programme, a minimalist form of 
support for disadvantaged people, and the Troubled Families Programme, a scheme that 
targets jobless families to tackle alleged criminality and anti-social behavior. In France and 
Slovenia, by contrast, it has funded less punitive schemes. ESF participation has pushed 
local actors towards ‘activation’ discourses and practices in various ways, especially where 
local contexts have hitherto resisted them (Gerven et al, 2014). Some organizations may be 
more changed by ESF participation than others, reflecting individual preferences (e.g. 
resistance to increased administrative workload) and the reliability of existing national 
funding (so-called ‘integral funds’ that are combined with ESF) (Zimmermann, 2016).  
Organization studies and the nascent marketization literature can help explain this 
variation. 
 
Project dynamics in organization studies 
Over time, project organization can destabilize the organizational field of social protection 
leading to a shift of risk onto workers. As organization studies shows, precarious project 
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dynamics matter for organizations and workers. Some large firms organize work in-house 
as projects, while others are created exclusively for a single project (Sydow et al, 2004); 
some firms staff projects by buying-in expertise temporarily or by redeploying staff 
internally (Whitley, 2006); some project work is repeated and other projects are one-off 
(Grabher, 2004). The literature suggests several reasons why project dynamics might be 
precarious. 
One starting point is that some tasks are suited to precarious project organization. 
Stinchcombe (1959) argues that cyclical fluctuations in construction work created a need 
for non-bureaucratic organization structure, specifically projects. Whitley (2006) argues 
that project-based firms are likely to be ‘precarious’ when they produce ‘singular and risky 
outputs’. For Grabher (2004), the search for convention-defying original knowledge 
requires ‘disruptive learning regimes’ (presumably with low job security), as in London’s 
advertising industry. 
Organization studies scholars show how institutional context shapes projects. 
Typically institutions are used to explain differences across space that are stable across 
time, which enable particular kinds of work, for example, by generating skills and 
knowledge in a particular place (Grabher, 2004; Whitley, 2006; Mueller, Pemsel, and Shao 
2014). Christopherson (2002) argues that employment relations institutions can mitigate 
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precarity, where they enable project workers to exercise a high degree of collective power. 
However, she also shows how the deregulation of product and labor markets can undermine 
this power, permitting low-cost production sites where work is more precarious. Lundin et 
al (2015), by contrast, argue that projectification per se makes it difficult for European 
institutions to provide stability because of increased worker mobility. 
Temporality is another factor. Timeframes may determine project flexibility and 
scope for innovative thought within them (Bakker et al, 2016); project time horizons need 
not be of shorter duration than those in permanent bureaucratic organizations, given the 
annual budget cycles of the latter. Uncertainty about timeframes is an important source of 
precarity for project workers (Karmowska et al, 2017), although informal ways of 
extending timeframes through social contact and networks may counteract this. Dille and 
Söderlund (2011) note that institutions can determine the speed and cycles of projects, and 
that institutional differences can make it difficult to synchronize different actors in a 
project. Specified end-dates do not necessarily signal an end to work on a project, which 
may be sustained by enduring funder-provider relationships (Lithgart et al, 2016). Project 
work may also have continuity by virtue of the reproduction of stable roles across different 
tasks (Beckhy, 2006).  
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Hence the task, institutions, temporality, and project roles offer explanations for 
variation in project dynamics in organization studies. But in social services we must 
consider another dimension: the role of the state in structuring the organizational field. 
 
Transactions and project dynamics 
Our approach to the state’s role in this organizational field centers on its management of 
transactions and organization of markets. As Ahrne et al (2015) argue, markets are often 
organized by some agent in a non-spontaneous way, typically with an eye to ensuring 
stability in an organizational field. We can therefore expect to observe some effort to 
mitigate project precarity. Social services are an illuminating context to examine market 
organizers because of the decisive role of the state in funding projects and organizing 
transactions.  
By separating purchaser and provider, governments can organize transactions 
between them with aim of optimizing cost, quality, and responsiveness. Government bodies 
define incentives and provide resources to varied providers (Le Grand, 2003). These 
transactions vary widely: some are highly competitive and price-based, while others 
involve long-term ongoing cooperation with price a secondary concern (Greer et al 2017). 
Under different kinds of transactions researchers have observed different patterns of 
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interorganizational relationships: intense price-based competition favors commercial 
organizations hyper-responsive to incentives to delivering quantitative results (Greer et al 
forthcoming), whereas relatively uncompetitive transactions can allow networks of 
nonprofits to cooperate driven by a professional social-work ethos (Jantz et al 2016; 
Schulte et al forthcoming). Competition in social services tends to disrupt existing 
organizational networks (Hipp and Warner, 2008), especially those with a social-work 
ethos (Greer et al forthcoming). 
In social services, the nature of the task has been reshaped by the transaction. This 
is the reverse of transaction cost economics, which sees the governance of transactions as 
shaped by the nature of the task (Williamson, 1985). Depending on the task, it is argued, 
transactions may be highly competitive and arms-length and others may involve more 
intensive interorganizational relations. In social services, however, the transaction has been 
deliberately used to re-engineer services. Unlike grants, which allow for co-production of 
services between funder and provider, public procurement law requires most funders to 
define them in a detailed way a priori. This makes it difficult for provider organizations to 
innovate based on knowledge gained during the contract (Greer et al, 2017, chapter 6) and 
disrupts the inter-provider relationships needed for some services (Hipp and Warner 2008). 
Price-based competition can also lead to the institutionalization of adverse selection in 
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commercial service providers (Greer et al forthcoming). The European level creates further 
complications through periodic changes in priorities, leading to negotiations with member 
states over how to deploy funds. 
Project timeframes are also shaped by the transaction. Most obviously, short-term 
contracts lead to short projects. But governments can also increase temporal uncertainty by 
opening markets to new competitors who may compete to take over if projects are renewed, 
or by introducing discretionary extension options (Greer et al, 2017).  
The transaction also influences worker roles within provider organizations. Public 
funders can decide whether to require formal social work qualifications among project 
staff. In German job-placement services, the absence of such rules for some services 
enabled providers to employ less qualified staff with lower job security than those working 
under direct public purchasing (Greer et al, forthcoming).  
Finally, the transnational dimension of transactions shapes local context. This is 
particularly important in European social services. National governments become 
intermediaries in the administration of funds, negotiating with the Commission over 
whether their priorities match EU concepts such as ‘active inclusion’. In France these 
intermediaries are a web of regional and local institutions including ‘deconcentrated’ 
regional offices of government ministries, reinforcing longer-term trends towards 
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administrative decentralization (Bezes and Le Lidec, 2011). In Slovenia, intermediaries are 
emerging but remain mostly centralized within government institutions (Samaluk, 2017). 
Under austerity pressures, ESF moneys are assuming a greater share of social service 
spending. As we will show, using this money places severe administrative demands on 
national governments and project workers.  
 
Our argument 
Explaining this contrast requires understanding the administrative capacity of government 
funders as project organizers, or, more specifically as transaction organizers. Transaction 
organizers often manage project transactions with an eye to stabilizing the organizational 
field of service providers; but the Slovenian case reveals that they are not always able to do 
so. Without a transaction organizer characterized by strong administrative capacity, project 
dynamics become precarious, leading to a shift of risk onto project workers.  
Transaction organizers often resemble what Lundin et al (2015) call ‘project-
supporting organizations’: they are permanent organizations with stable organizational 
features which also contain regularly changing projects. In both countries, funders are 
public-sector organizations that have been reconfigured to act as an intermediary between 
Europe and localities, including coordinating local networks of service providers and 
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distributing funds. These are typically referred to as ‘purchasing agents’ in public 
administration literature, and the organizational fields they engender as ‘quasi-markets’ (Le 
Grand 2003).  
The methods for distributing funds are a powerful tool to  stabilize organizational 
fields. The providers of these services resemble what Lundin et al (2015) call ‘project-
based organizations’, since project work accounts for most of their activity. Because project 
funding is always temporary, these organizations and their staff are vulnerable to funding 
loss. In this paper we focus specifically on ESF-supported project-based organizations 
providing social services. Transaction organizers can mitigate (or exacerbate) these 
problems through decisions about how much competition there should be with non-
incumbents, how decisive the price mechanism should be in selecting providers, the project 
timeframe, and the detail in which the service is prescribed (Greer et al 2017).   
Not every transaction organizer can manage transactions effectively. One problem 
highlighted by ESF evaluators has been timing. The launch of new ESF-funded programs 
in the accession countries, took place under additional rules, regulations, and checks, and 
this was ‘made even more complicated by insufficient experience, lack of administrative 
capacity and internal reorganizations processes of public administrations that undermine 
administrative continuity’ (Bubbico and De Michaelis, 2011: 6). Slovenia entered the EU in 
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2004, immediately before a change between ESF ‘programming periods’, whereby the 
European Commission increased the administrative requirements for launching new 
programs for 2007-2013. The problem was similar to Dille and Söderlund’s (2011) notion 
of a ‘temporal misfit’; governments in new member states were not adapted to the EU’s 
budget cycles. A second problem is austerity, which imposes resource scarcity on both 
transaction organizer and service provider. It reduces the transaction organizer’s ability to 
mitigate problems, create programs, and pay staff, and creates even greater dependence on 
the ESF.  
Both of these problems emanate from the transnational level. Transnational 
pressures increased after the economic crisis, when EU governance demanded stricter fiscal 
discipline and introduced a more prescriptive approach to social policy reform. While the 
post-crisis need for expanded social infrastructure increased, Slovenia had to reduce 
spending for social protection programs and imposed strict limits to public sector hiring 
which were less severe in France. Moreover, Slovenia is characterized by less generous 
social protection spending (17.4% of GDP) than France (24.5% of GDP)3. These factors 
increased Slovenian dependence on the ESF, thus opening social protection field more 
dramatically to new participants, approaches, and organization types. 




The conditions under which project dynamics are precarious thus hinge on the 
transaction. Past research finds that transaction organizers often intensify these problems by 
promoting intense price-based competition at the level of the transaction (Greer et al, 
2017). For the present comparison the transaction matters in a different way: the transaction 
organizer is not deliberately disrupting the field by promoting competition, but rather 




Our research design has inductive and deductive elements. Inspired by the grounded theory 
tradition, we used qualitative interviews to generate unexpected insights (Glaser and 
Strauss 2017). From past studies, we understood the basic features of the task, transactions, 
and socio-economic context. We discovered inductively in early interviews the features of 
project organization, its relationship with the transaction, and the differing levels of 
precarity between the two cases. Initial interviews were completed, translated and English-
language notes coded openly. After discussing the material and the coding scheme, we 
conducted further interviews. Based on further discussion of codes and findings, we 
developed a common framework, whose characteristics structure our empirical presentation 
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and comparison: (1) the pressures acting on states; (2) state capacity to organize 
transactions; and (3) the precariousness of project work. We used these for a final coding of 
the English-language transcripts and notes.  
Inspired by King et al (1994) we sought to explain the main outcome – precarious 
versus non-precarious project dynamics – by examining cases that differ in terms of it, but 
do not differ in terms of various other variables that might matter. Beyond the shared issue 
of projectification, there were important similarities between the cases in terms of 
institutional context, task and roles. Some obvious differences, such as the size of the 
country, age of the state, and post-socialist heritage, did not significantly affect our 
outcome.  
We derive our analysis from qualitative interviews with policymakers, workers and 
managers at provider organizations, and other key informants (trade unionists, provider 
umbrella bodies and academic researchers), which provide specialized knowledge 
concerning a complex and changing organizational field. Participants were recruited 
through cold-calling and office visits, with further snowball sampling based on these initial 
contacts. As table two shows, this included 36 participants in each country, mostly 




(Table 1 about here) 
 
The size difference posed a challenge for research design. While our Slovenian 
interviews spanned the country, we concentrated on one specific French department, Seine-
Saint-Denis (population 1.6m). This is a low-income area with elevated spending on 
regeneration schemes, including ESF-funded programs to assist socially marginalized 
groups. This enabled a qualitative focus on the governance of ESF projects as rich as the 
Slovenian data, which a nationwide investigation would complicate. The workers we met in 
Seine-Saint-Denis may be in a less precarious situation than their counterparts elsewhere in 
France given the high need and spending locally and the strong tradition of leftwing local 
government, but it is difficult to say this conclusively without further research. Our purpose 
is to compare two in-depth studies to illuminate causal mechanisms, with the French case 
being representative of Seine-Saint-Denis rather than the entire country.  
 
Slovenia 
Pressures on the state 
In Slovenia, projectification has taken place as the main transaction organizer, the Ministry 
of Labor, Family and Social Affairs (MLFSA), has seen its capacity to organize social 
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service project transactions sharply diminished. This has weakened its grasp over the 
organizational field of provision, which has also become less stable. Transnational forces 
have played a central role, especially the post-crisis shift in EU governance towards stricter 
fiscal discipline based on binding Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) and ESF 
conditionality (Keune and Payton, 2017). This shift happened alongside negotiations over 
the 2014-2020 financial perspective, leaving national negotiators unprepared and surprised 
at the force with which EU requirements were imposed: 
The EC was very cunning. . . like other countries also Slovenia did not want active 
employment and social policies to be governed by the EU policy, because we 
wanted to keep it under our sovereignty. . . I was very shocked in these 
negotiations… These CSRs are no joke anymore, because they will squeeze you, no 
matter how illogical they are (SL policymaker 2). 
ESF moneys have increasingly come to fill domestic funding gaps, increasing ESF influence 
in policy. Already the previous perspective had brought substantial policy reform and 
institutional adjustment, which were unsustainable under austerity conditions and given the 
recurrent change pressures imposed by ESF-driven ‘modernization’. National funders were 
discouraged from continuing funding ESF projects that were covered under the previous 
financial perspective and which could not, under austerity, be covered by integral funds:  
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Previous experience was that [coordinators at the ministry] would do things their 
own way . . . During negotiations [for the 2014-2020 perspective] the Slovenian 
side proposed that we continue financing successful innovative projects, which used 
to be financed within active labor market programs and social entrepreneurship ESF 
schemes . . . But they said: “No, this is not the purpose.” There is a logic behind it 
that you should [use this money] to set up something, try something new and then it 
should become part of the system (SL policymaker 3). 
Difficulties in meeting the new conditions weakened Slovenia’s ability to maintain existing 
projects, forcing adoption of new active inclusion policies.  Increasing dependence on EU 
funds generated competition among ministries, which sought to associate their own briefs 
with the active inclusion agenda.  
 Inter-ministerial competition and compliance with preliminary ESF conditions 
caused delays in absorbing funds. The 2014-2020 funds will be absorbed in 2017-2022. 
These delays intensified pressure for rapid integration of active inclusion with social policy. 
For instance, MLFSA gave a think tank only three months to prepare guidelines for 
implementing active inclusion. One participant explains the difficulties of operationalizing 
ambiguous new concepts: 
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I think it’s good for Slovenia to get new concepts and approaches, although 
sometimes we cannot distinguish between what are only buzzwords…When we 
looked up the meaning of social activation, there was no clear definition, 
everywhere it says: “This is not only aimed at labor market integration, but more at 
social integration, but it’s beneficial if it results in employment.” Thus very unclear 
and practices are even less clear (SL policymaker 3). 
The Slovenian adaptation of active inclusion followed models from Western Europe, 
prioritizing ‘employability’ and tightening connections between social support and the job 
search for clients with complex issues (Trbanc, 2015). Slovenia thus faced many challenges 
as the recipient, rather than the shaper, of EU policy concepts.  
Under the previous financial perspective the ESF policy agenda had already brought 
new organization types to the Slovenian social protection field, namely ‘social enterprise’, 
which allows traditional non-profit organizations to receive initial funds to establish new 
entities that undertake economic activity (Commission, 2014). This organizational concept 
was not well adapted to the Slovenian context. A 20114 law transposed EU-propagated 
definitions despite the long existence of disability enterprises and care work centers 





performing similar functions in Slovenia. 'Social entrepreneurship is only a modern term of 
what we've always had in Slovenia. . . . when this concept was implemented we should 
have established better its local meaning . . . that could support already-existing local 
‘social enterprises’' (SL policymaker 2). The ESF definition prompted the emergence of a 
new organization type prioritized for funding support, threatening existing non-profits and 
opening social policy provision to new actors (Samaluk, 2017). Many small nonprofits lack 
the means to pre-finance projects (which the ESF requires), let alone maintain them after 
ESF funding expires. Consequently, many established non-profits had refused to apply for 
ESF-funded projects for the establishment of social enterprise under the previous 
perspective or struggled to survive after funding ceased (Samaluk 2017).  
Austerity pressures, rapid EU integration, and the demand for new organization 
types combined to put extreme pressure on Slovenian state, reducing its capacity to 
organize transactions in social services, as we show next. 
 
Weak capacity to organize transactions 
Slovenian service provider organizations fall into two broad types. Social protection has 
traditionally been provided by local public-sector Centers for Social Work (CSWs), dating 
to former Yugoslavia (Zaviršek, 2008). These are supported by various non-profit 
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organizations, which emerged during the 1990s to address neglected social needs (such as 
disability, mental health, domestic violence and equality struggles). Employment services 
date back to 1900 and are provided by the Employment Service of Slovenia (ESS), also a 
public-sector organization supported by non-profit and private service providers, which 
provide labor market integration projects with weaker public oversight than in social 
protection. Active inclusion seeks to bring these actors closer together, requiring social 
protection providers to focus on preparing users to ‘return’ to ESS as jobseekers. This ESF-
driven merging of previously separate policy areas further strained Slovenian state capacity.  
ESF funding is managed mainly by a central government ministry, MLFSA. Most 
active inclusion projects fall under its remit, but the central ESS office also receives ESF 
funds to manage tenders for services provided by NGOs. Under ESF guidance, the ESS 
office has established a project office responsible for coordinating ESF-funded projects, but 
no similar project-supporting organization yet exists in the social protection field, which 
until recently was less directly shaped by the active inclusion agenda. This presents 
problems for the administration of social protection programs: ‘Great, programs yes, but 
without structure that will manage this, there’s no chance . . .  The ministry is not able to do 
that. We hardly managed a couple of tenders, which were worth €50 million at most, let 
alone the current €200 million’ (SL policymaker 2). 
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Moreover, there are problems finding provider organizations to deliver ‘active 
inclusion’ services. Public-sector CSWs were reluctant to perform the task, seeing 
themselves as ill-adapted to the objective. Although nonprofit incumbents in the social 
protection field were skeptical of the active inclusion agenda, a lack of integral funds 
pressed them to explore alternative funding sources to develop additional services: ‘[We 
apply for EU projects] because this is the only way to do something more apart from 
already established things' (SL provider1). 
These problems were debilitating for transaction organizers, which lacked willing 
service providers for the new agenda. ESF funding was used to encourage provider 
organizations to embrace the ideas of active inclusion. ‘CSWs…did not want to deal with 
these users, mostly arguing…that they do not have appropriate programs. Then we [the 
ESS] said: “We will prepare a pilot project and this might encourage them”’ (SL provider 
5).  In the pilot, a tender for NGOs was issued to assess the ‘employability potential’ of 
long-term welfare recipients: ‘The tender was very broad…they wanted to have providers 
in all regions. Somewhere there were many applicants and they could choose and in other 
they could not. Somewhere there was only one applicant and this one was chosen.’ (SL 
policymaker 3). Another, in Spring 2017, for long- and short-term projects had similar 
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problems: for short-term projects, the tender had to be adapted to encourage more 
applicants, and for long-term ones calls had to be repeated to find applicants in all regions5.  
ESF weakened regulatory requirements, such as professional verification by the 
Social Chamber6, in stipulating that funding be open to all providers. Moreover, aside from 
reluctance to embrace the active inclusion concept, many organizations could not meet pre-
financing requirements. Consequently, most organizations that did apply under the pilot 
were those that also provided high-threshold ESS-managed projects, which are subject to 
weaker regulatory oversight (Lebar et al, 2014).  
 The evaluation [of the pilot] showed that many providers did not know the target 
groups … in one region a driving school ended up being a provider, because it was 
the only one that applied for this region…It was very clear that providers did not 
know what to do with these people, and there were no conditions regarding exits…. 
They [ESS] have some providers, which are not highly regarded by the CSWs (SL 
policymaker 3). 




6 The Social Chamber of Slovenia is a central professional social welfare association preparing regulations 
and standards governing social welfare services and qualification standards for different activities and for 
the assessment of professional work. 
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Incumbent service providers were thus marginalized vis-à-vis new entrants whose 
management and staff lacked a social work orientation. The rapid implementation of ESF-
funded pilot schemes also created confusion around providers’ tasks and administrative 
obligations:  
The [pilot] project was too quickly set up, because the funds needed to be used. It 
was not thought through, which also affected users’ rights… These people were 
forgotten from institutions for 15 years and now they were expected to be present 
every day 100 per cent. So this was one problem. The sick leave was not defined. 
There was problem with travel expenses… Due to that our work was very difficult 
over this four month period…every time we saw each other we discussed money 
issues. You are confronted but you cannot do anything, but direct them to CSWs. 
And they didn’t trust them. It was crazy! (SL provider 12). 
The ESF-supported implementation of active inclusion weakened the state’s 
capacity to organize transactions in the social protection field and pushed providers to 
engage in ill-defined experimental projects. Consequences include the lack of management 
structures, difficulty in finding willing providers, unclear and changing obligations, and the 




Towards a precarious projectariat 
Disrupting the social protection field has increased the precariousness of project work. 
Workers have less access to permanent jobs, and their professional status is threatened, 
particularly in terms of pay and monitoring at work. This applies to for-profit and non-
profit project-based organizations, but also public-sector providers, where front-line service 
and coordination work has shifted from permanent to project-based organizations. 
Under the 2007-2014 financial perspective, public-sector jobs in the CSWs and 
ESSs funded by ESF were turned into temporary project-based ones (Samaluk, 2017). 
While austerity prevented the creation of permanent jobs, CSWs received an additional 62 
ESF-funded temporary project workers. These temporary posts were rendered attractive by 
higher pay and the promise of future permanent contracts. These promises have not been 
fulfilled: all posts created under the previous financial perspective were terminated at its 
end. There were not enough integral funds, and the second perspective imposed different 
priorities that made these positions ineligible for funding. The 52 current project workers 
delivering active inclusion have received similar promises, but their access to permanent 
contracts depends on future ESF priorities. The combination of changing ESF priorities and 
austerity has thus brought insecure project-based organization also into public sector 
provision. Continuing recruitment caps are especially problematic for young and 
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unemployed professionals, whose entry into the public sector is limited and granted only 
intermittently through temporary ESF-funded projects. Moreover, the ESF has unreliably 
financed social care internships that allow young graduates to gain experience to qualify for 
a professional license, leaving many young graduates without an essential requirement to 
obtain permanent professional jobs (Samaluk, 2017). 
Among non-profit, traditionally project-based organizations, some additional 
stability arrived after 1998 when MLFSA began offering five-year instead of three-year 
contracts. While salaries within non-profits are linked to projects, they are based on 
collective agreements and laws defined within the public sector7. When funded integrally, 
social protection workers operate under the professional standards of Slovenia’s Social 
Chamber8. But the volume of integral funding has been cut under austerity:  
I am linked to a project financed by the MLFSA. This is a 5-year project also 
verified by the Social Chamber…And we need to apply for this project and verify it 
every 5 years…We are all dependent on project funds, so those of us who are more 
long-term are normally on more stable projects (SL provider 4).  
High regulatory requirements also limit competition for future tenders, reducing uncertainty 
on integrally funded projects. Nevertheless, while permanent contracts are favored for the 
                                                          




sake of simplicity, one NGO manager told us: “everyone knows that this permanency 
depends upon projects…For instance, next year one project expires and we are applying [to 
renew it]. We will most probably get it, but nothing is certain. So if we are unsuccessful 
four people lose their jobs and we have to close our daily center” (SL provider 3).  
 The decline in domestic funding also increased salary volatility in integrally funded 
projects, which become increasingly dependent on alternative sources of funding:  
The salaries are defined according to the amount you can apply for in a specific 
project. We have certain rules regarding that…which are grounded in rules set for 
the area of social protection…However there is a problem, while due to the crisis 
the ministry has yearly decreased…[integral] funds, which also cover salaries…we 
try to keep salaries stable, but not always, some had to decrease…We try as much 
as we can by drawing from other funds (SL provider 7). 
While in 2016 domestic funding started to return to pre-crisis levels (Smolej-Jež et al, 
2017), ESF-resources have provided an ever-higher proportion. Where ESF funds are 
concerned, project dynamics are more precarious. Tenders are open to a more diverse range 
of actors, meaning professional standards are of secondary concern and collective 
agreements over salaries are not necessarily applied. This has encouraged work 
intensification and the hollowing out of established professional roles. Project workers 
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perceived a devaluation of the social work ethos through increasingly bureaucratic and ill-
defined obligations. One ESF-funded project worker describes this experience:  
When we had this ESF project, a second-hand shop, which employs our users…it 
was bureaucratically very demanding, they were exclusively interested in 
paperwork…One example: we opened a shop and we had this idea to equip it 
together with users …The idea was that they are included in the overall process. If 
you are equipping a shop you need screws to fit in the shelves… we send them the 
bill and they required additional information, why we need these screws… we send 
them pictures … and two pages of explanation. They said that this is not allowed… 
They were never interested in content only that all the papers were in order (SL 
provider 8). 
Another refers to a previous pilot project:  
The project lasted four months, which is quite long, but if you also have to deal with 
bureaucracy, it is not… There was a bunch of things that were unforeseen…CSWs 
told us that we should be professional enough to distance ourselves from [users’] 
social distress. But you cannot, if you work with users for four months three times a 
week…It affected all of us, we were all under stress. (SL provider 12) 
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The responsibility to deliver the ESF-funded activation agenda has thus been downloaded 
into increasingly high-pressure work in project NGOs: ‘There is constant insecurity, 
working on the edge, on the border, because you never know, if it is going to go through. 
There is never enough capacity, never enough space…the working conditions are not 
optimal’ (SL NGO provider 9). 
With disproportionally large amounts of EU funds available for activation, these 
pressures will mount on NGO providers. Stagnant integral funding, diminishing public-
sector job opportunities and ESF-induced projectification are pushing social work graduates 
and unemployed professionals into the NGO sector, often for little, or even no pay 
(Samaluk, 2017). While NGO senior managerial staff contracts are normally linked to 
relatively secure integral projects, young graduates and unemployed professionals enter 
either through ESF-funded projects and programs (Ibid).  In this context, new entrants are 
also encouraged to create their own jobs by applying for administratively demanding ESF 
projects: ‘This girl came to me and said: “I would like to intern at your organization” I said: 
“Great. Look there is a tender out, apply for it. You will take over all the bureaucracy…”. I 
helped her… so she learned a lot of these bureaucratic things’ (SL provider 3). This is 
evidently encouraged by the absence of structural and human resource capacities to manage 
resources. For instance, the management of ESF-funded internships was reluctantly taken 
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by the Social Chamber following pressures from self-organized students demanding paid 
internships:  ‘This was a lot of work. At the end Social Chamber prepared the project with 
the help of three students, who were then fighting [for paid internships]’ (SL social work 
student). 
The continuing ESF-driven shift towards activation, combined with austerity 
pressures, engineers the precarious projectariat: it has intensified work and weakened 
oversight of qualifications, thus undermining professional statuses and embedding 
temporary work relationships. Our interviews indicate that the burden of ESF bureaucracy 
in Slovenia falls disproportionally on young and unemployed professionals, whose job 
prospects are increasingly dependent on accessing ESF-funded projects. Since ESF projects 
are a relative novelty in Slovenian social services field and branded as an innovation, they 
can also be perceived as an attractive opportunity to young or excluded professionals, who 
are not yet familiar with their bureaucratic burdens or organizations’ financial difficulties to 
turn them into more permanent organizational forms. Without sufficient stable integral 
funding to turn ESF-driven project work into permanent programs, the insecurity of 
precarious projectariat is likely to increase. This lack of resources reinforces the state’s 
weak capacity to shape the social protection field via transactions, leaving it particularly 
exposed to transnational pressures.  
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 While the established public-sector unions, NGO umbrella bodies, and new 
movements of precarious and young workers have fought against the disruption of services 
and jobs and have won some victories, the precarious projectariat remains on the margins 
of political discourse and the trade union movement, which continues to address its 
demands at the national government rather than the EU level. More than France, 
transnational influences undermine the ability of Slovenia’s national institutions to protect 
workers ill-equipped to cope with projectification.  
 
France 
Weaker pressures on the state 
In France, by contrast, weaker transnational pressures and stronger state capacity have 
permitted stability in the social protection field by allowing the maintenance of stable 
relationships between funders and long-established provider networks in the face of 
projectification. The main transaction organizer is DIRECCTE, a “deconcentrated” public 
agency that administers ESF funding, whose regional branches are directly accountable to 
central government. Its regional branches manage transactions with provider organizations, 
but departmental offices exercise some latitude in choosing providers (FR policymaker 1).  
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Other transaction organizers are non-profit intermediaries such as PLIE, which 
distribute funds across groups of municipalities. Typically, PLIE channels funding to 
finance various individual workers across a network of local providers, charged with 
delivering a defined service pathway. It also funds specific projects such as ‘integration 
work-sites’ [chantiers d’insertion]. DIRECCTE funds provider organizations directly, with 
contracts normally lasting one year. Fundees are typically paid 18-24 months after the 
award of the contract. At PLIE, projects can run for up to three years, usually being 
reassessed after one: if satisfied, PLIE asks that central government requests the release of 
ESF funds, mitigating the problems pre-financing requirements impose on providers (FR 
policymaker 4). 
These timeframes are no longer than those found in Slovenia. The critical difference 
is the transaction through which projects are initiated and governed. French funders 
distinguish between calls for projects [appels à projet] and calls for tender [appels d’offre]. 
The latter refer to calls for bids following a precise, funder-defined tender. The former, 
through which most PLIE and DIRECCTE-awarded funding passes, require organizations 
to define the project they offer, the needs it meets, and measurable objectives, which are 
then evaluated in relation to funders’ perceptions of local needs. Hence, calls for projects 
imply more autonomy for the provider in defining their intervention, and funders tend to 
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rely on this initiative in diagnosing unmet needs. PLIE does issue calls for tenders for 
smaller one-off projects, which are delineated from core social work functions.  
This enduringly high level of provider input is the distinguishing characteristic of 
the organization of transactions in French activation projects. Pressures associated with EU 
integration and austerity have been weaker (France still maintains comparatively generous 
spending on social protection by European standards) and transactions are thus less directly 
shaped by ESF-defined terms. Nonetheless, ESF conditions and domestic political trends 
do shape the intervention funded and administrative reporting duties involved. The next 
section shows why these have been less disruptive in France than Slovenia.  
 
Co-evolution of the transaction 
French funders tend to channel ESF and national funding towards long-established 
incumbent “project-based organizations” rather than new entrants: longstanding practice is 
to use EU funds to complement existing activities and support a strong existing 
infrastructure and approach. This has not been overwhelmed by ESF administrative 
requirements. While project timeframes may be short, both funders and fundees confirmed 
that the same structures typically received funding year-on-year, unsurprising given 
funders’ reliance on provider initiative in designing interventions. Unlike Slovenia, where 
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the ESF disrupts established networks: ‘here there is an associative network that is already 
very developed, and as a result so established’ (FR policymaker 2). While ESF priorities 
change, funders and providers discussed the integration of new work with existing 
interventions, rather than disrupting the field through new tenders (FR provider 3). 
Elsewhere, a manager describes funder-provider dialogue: 
So for example, for this year 2015, we must work a lot on the development axis, the 
environment, for example. We must also work on all that is linked to questions of 
mobility for young people- national, international- to push them to travel, to 
discover the outside. We will also work on questions more of professional 
integration, jobs, lots of things. Voilà! There are orientations which are effectively 
defined, that we must pursue, and others where we are freer (FR provider 4). 
One respondent at PLIE (FR policymaker 4) had previously managed ESF funding in post-
socialist countries (not Slovenia) and his comparative experiences proved instructive. He 
saw these stable funder-provider relationships as distinctively French, noting that it forms 
an explicit strategy of adapting ESF resources to suit what is already in place, rather than 
vice versa.  
Strict evaluation criteria are not embraced in monitoring the transaction: ‘we aren’t 
in a culture of evaluation… putting the associative network into competition would make 
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no sense’ since providers had evolved over a long period in tandem with local needs (FR 
policymaker 2). At PLIE, similar comments were made (FR policymaker 4): 
[First participant:] With a call for projects we don’t really have this notion of 
creating competition. It exists even so because we’ll choose the projects that 
correspond with ours.  
[Second participant:] It’s more qualitative… 
[Third participant:] It’s more about choosing the people with whom we want to 
work and we work with the same people for several years 
When outcomes were assessed, both funders and providers saw room for extensive 
qualitative discretion, including reflection on contextual reasons why targets had been 
missed, giving greater latitude to incumbent organizations in justifying their performance 
(and for funders to extend projects). These services have been criticized in national political 
discussion for achieving low numbers of job placements, leading to calls from some 
quarters for more commercial provision and a Sarkozy-era pilot of for-profit operators in 
Seine-Saint-Denis. Local providers and funders did not trust the new players, and 
evaluators found that the new schemes were more expensive and no more effective than 
existing ones (Schulte et al, 2017). After this brief experiment, for-profit firms did not 
establish themselves as major local players in this field. 
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The funders are committed to maintaining the field of social protection in Seine-
Saint-Denis. The PLIE will, if necessary, advance money from its own budget to mitigate 
the risks caused by pre-financing requirements. This was one reason given for founding the 
organization. Similarly, at DIRECCTE: ‘we always come to give them a little subsidy… 
because there are jobs there, and if they do a good job in insertion we can’t do without 
them either’ (FR policymaker 2). The active role of funders in maintaining the incumbent 
organizations with whom they develop and deliver services has mitigated the emergence of 
a precarious projectariat in various ways. 
 
Absence of a precarious projectariat 
While some interviewees expressed concerns about the ‘precarisation’ of social work in 
France (FR NGO umbrella 2), the situation in our research site was comparatively stable. 
Like in Slovenia, ESF funding has intensified administrative burdens, causing work 
intensification. However, the emphasis on the quality of relationships between the funder 
and incumbent providers has greatly mitigated potential consequences. 
Managers at nonprofit providers placed great importance on the experience and 
training of front-line workers (FR providers 2 and 3). Respondents repeatedly emphasized 
the importance of specific training qualifications and experience profiles, individual 
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autonomy and problem-solving in the labor process, and close-knit teams. The extent of 
this professional autonomy has been examined in greater detail elsewhere (Schulte et al, 
forthcoming). Front-line interviewees described in interviews how service users’ trajectory 
through activation pathways depended more on individual staff expertise than on funder-
defined indicators (FR providers 15-17).  
As in Slovenia, administrative workload was increasing, often driven by ESF 
conditionality. One front-line respondent at a nonprofit asked about bureaucratic 
encroachment on their labor process referred promptly to ESF: ‘it was necessary to have 
quarantaines of columns, so many lines with accompanied people . . . the limitation on 
autonomy is at that level’ (FR provider 12). Our interviewees were in widespread 
agreement that ESF conditionality had intensified these requirements. At one organization, 
for instance, ESF record-keeping requirements had led them to introduce an annual week-
long closure of the service to free up time to comply (FR provider 11).  
However, the implications of increased administrative burdens for front-line staff 
had been cushioned. As noted, organizations could typically offer qualitative justifications 
for shortfalls; this reduced precarity associated with project temporality, since relationships 
clearly preceded, and extended beyond, specific project end-points (Lithgart et al, 2017). 
Hence the risks associated with the need to hit funder-defined targets had not translated into 
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intense performance management, and job security was assumed to extend beyond existing 
project timeframes. Several interviewees expressed the belief that providers cannot 
properly serve service users if staff are precarious themselves. This did not only come from 
front-line workers; one manager told us: ‘we consider that one can’t help people in 
situations of great precarity, one can’t fight against precarity, if in our own structures, we 
have people in situations of precarity’ (FR provider 3).  
Consequently, staff interviewees tended to feel relatively secure in their work. One 
described planning his career for 2-3 years in advance, seeing his current position as a 
reliable stepping stone and opportunity to learn new skills (FR provider 13). Most frontline 
staff interviewees were hired on permanent contracts, including those working in fairly 
peripheral roles, such as one tutor who worked at the provider only 2-3 hours per week (FR 
provider 17). Fixed-term contracts were used primarily fill gaps caused by long-term leave, 
and were often concentrated in support roles rather than frontline counsellors. 
Most insertion workers’ terms and conditions are regulated by a national convention 
which imposes a salary grid, though some organizations had opted out of this (FR provider 
3). Unlike in Slovenia, where ESF projects were stimulating new organizations following 
watered-down regulatory frameworks, professional qualifications remained important, 
reflected in attempts driven by government to link the salary grid more tightly to 
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qualifications (FR provider 15). In France the ESF did not stimulate the kind of innovation 
that would disrupt national collective bargaining agreements or the professionalization of 
jobs in the sector; collective agreements remained and formal qualifications were 
increasingly important for staff: 
Because the profession has developed, today to apply for a counsellor’s post, you 
will be asked about experience, or about passing counsellor training, or about 
having a study level of bac +2 in sociology/psychology. That’s the profile which is 
looked for. 10-15 years ago, without having that profile, you could all the same 
have a chance to find work in this domain. But since it’s evolved a lot, and that they 
are trying now to put all the [public-sector service providers] on the same level shall 
we say, bah, there is a collective national contract with a national wage grid (FR 
provider 10). 
Innovation had taken place together with professionalization, which worked against 
precarity in project work. Respondents, however, did stress that under budget pressures the 
overall salary levels had declined in real terms, and that the progression from one index 
point to the next was generally quite modest.  
These remarks about France require qualification. While these jobs were relatively 
stable, many interviewees were worried about austerity pressures and political dynamics, 
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and the phrase ‘not yet’ was a constant theme of interviews. Emmanuel Macron, elected 
President shortly after our research, announced in October 2017 a ‘big bang institutionnel’ 
to restructure local government in the Paris region; 6 departements including Seine-Saint-
Denis responded by organizing a signature campaign in defense of front-line services.9 
Worries about insecurity were thus tied less to changes in ESF requirements but domestic 
politics. One respondent, interviewed in 2012, argued their organization had been de-
funded for its ‘Anti-Sarkozy’ stance (FR provider 1). A more recent interviewee argued: 
‘we are on [permanent contracts], we are stable but at the same time, we have in any case 
this sword of Damocles above our head… last year we had an economic redundancy simply 
because one of the actions that we were performing were no longer subsidized’ (FR 
provider 10). In addition, increasing reporting duties for both domestic and ESF funders 
were leading to a regimentation of the labor process:  
We are a bit more watched, and we are asked to make more and more placements. 
So inevitably the figures are more watched than before. So we will have more of 
these objectives about quantity in the figures rather than quality… Today we have a 
bit of freedom… Sometimes I have a meeting with [a user], it can take only ten 
minutes because he’s already well advanced in his project, we can solve two or 





three things very quickly, it takes ten minutes. But sometimes the meeting can take 
an hour, because the person has a big problem. So we work a little bit in our own 
way in spite of everything… But we recognize all the same that, more and more, 
that is changing. In other words… perhaps in some years we’ll be told “an interview 
is 30 minutes and no more (FR provider 8). 
The concern was that cost pressures would jeopardize qualitative elements of 
service provision, leading to reduced focus on track record and expertise of incumbent 
organizations and a diminishment in workers’ professional status. Our interviewees, 
however, attributed this to national political trends rather than ESF conditionality. Indeed, 
the umbrella body for French associations saw its lobbying efforts in Brussels as highly 
effective in preventing a new procurement directive from disrupting French funding 
arrangements (FR NGO Umbrella 1). If a precarious projectariat is to emerge in the French 
social protection field, it will likely be catalyzed by domestically driven austerity and new 
public management pressures, as it has already in the public employment service Pole 
Emploi (Lavitry, 2015). The creation of a precarious projectariat, however, has been 
obstructed in our French research site by transactions that favor incumbents and cement 





This paper asks: under what conditions does project organization produce precarity for 
front-line workers in social service projects? Although the precarity of projects is an 
important theme in the organization studies literature on projects (Graher, 2004; Whitley, 
2006), few studies have examined how project organization affects worker precarity 
(Petucci-Harris et al, 2015). We examine this question in a sector that has previously been 
overlooked in literature on projects, social services, where precarity is a crucially important 
concern of project organizers and workers. European funding is based upon project 
organization and is therefore an important driver of projectification in this context 
(Samaluk, 2017; Verschraegen et al, 2011; Zimmermann, 2016). Our first contribution is an 
empirical examination of project dynamics and its consequences for workers in a new and 
important setting. 
Our theoretical approach is distinctive, because it emphasizes the transaction as a 
key determinant of project dynamics. Where states are capable of acting effectively as 
transaction organizers, the drivers of precarious projectification can be mitigated, including 
those stemming from the transnational level. The transaction has been neglected in 
organization literature, which has tended to focus on factors such as task (Whitley, 2006), 
roles (Bechky, 2006), institutional context (Christopherson, 2002; Grabher, 2004), and 
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timeframe (Bakker et al, 2016) in explaining project dynamics. Our approach is consistent 
with the growing recognition in organization studies that markets themselves are organized 
in a non-spontaneous way by particular actors (Ahrne et al, 2015). Indeed, Sydow et al’s 
(2004) proposal for an actor-centered approach to project organization is readily 
transferable to the transaction: in social services, the government funder acts a transaction 
organizer. We argue that project dynamics in the “project-based organizations” that employ 
staff to deliver services depend on the administrative capacity of “project-supporting 
organizations” that organize transactions (Lundin et al, 2015). Our second contribution is 
thus to show how organization of the transaction can worsen or mitigate precarity in 
projectified organizational fields.  
We argue that the key difference in explaining why a precarious projectariat 
emerged in Slovenia rather than France is that, in Slovenia, the state’s capacity to organize 
project transactions was weakened, making the organizational field more vulnerable to 
destabilizing transnational influences. Slovenia still lacks effective ESF project-supporting 
organizations and willing service providers for the new agenda to organize this recently 
introduced transaction. In the context of austerity this weakened state’s capacity 
destabilizes the whole social protection field and introduces insecure project-based 
organization to previously secure permanent public sector organizations.  The problem was 
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not a domestic story of deteriorating quality of jobs and services, followed by tighter 
management; instead, the EU-level drove this weakness through ESF conditionality 
imposed at a difficult time, and post-crisis austerity pressures which compounded lower 
levels of social spending compared to France. The ESF imposed stringent new 
requirements in organizing transactions, which Slovenia struggled to meet, in part because 
it was a new member state. Hence, in issuing tenders, it relied on new organizational types 
over whom it had weak authority, while existing structures were made more fragile by ESF 
conditionality and its project-based organization.  
The French state’s transaction organizing function, by contrast, was not 
overwhelmed. Weaker austerity pressures and stable transaction organizer-provider 
relationships meant that the organization of transactions evolved through dialogue, which 
could incorporate ESF compliance without significant disruption. The upshot was that in 
France, social work professionals in the social protection field tended to retain relatively 
secure professional status and felt able to count on the renewal of funding settlements (and 
hence jobs) at the end of projects. In France, the main sources of perceived potential 
insecurity were national political trends rather than the EU level. Findings are summarized 




(Table 2 about here.) 
 
The theoretical implications of our findings concern the discussion in organization 
studies of projectification, in particular the effects of the organization of the transaction on 
project tasks, role structures, temporality, and institutional context. ESF funding has 
transformed the nature of the task in Slovenia by spreading the idea of ‘active inclusion’, 
while French policymakers have succeeded in selling their homegrown practices of 
insertion in these terms. ESF funding has altered role structures in Slovenia by opening the 
field to new providers, while in France local policymakers have found ways to protect 
incumbent local nonprofit providers and their staff. ESF funding has disrupted timeframes 
in Slovenian social services by precluding providers from using permanent employment 
contracts, while in France the protections for the local providers allow for continuity in the 
face of contract turnover. Finally, ESF funding – together with austerity – has altered the 
nature of welfare services in Slovenia by de-funding traditional services and shifting what 
resources remain to new kinds of services, while in France funders and providers have so 
far adjusted incrementally to austerity within the existing institutional framework. It 
remains to be seen whether Macron’s liberalizing agenda will force change and how our 
research site compares to other parts of France. 
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We draw on two strands of institutional theory that have influenced the 
projectification literature – transaction cost economics and field theory – but contributing to 
them is beyond the scope of this paper. Typically, the transaction-cost approach sees 
transaction governance as driven by efficiency maximization with parameters set by the 
task; an important puzzle for transaction cost economics is the reversal of this causal chain, 
in which the task itself is altered by the governance of the transaction. Similarly, the effects 
of transactions on organizational fields are important empirically, but remain unexamined 
in field theory. While this paper suggests these avenues for theoretical development, 
delivering on this potential is for future research.   
Our study raises the question of whether this connection between transactions and 
precarious project dynamics applies in organizational fields other than social services. Two 
key features of transactions highlighted in our argument point to broad relevance. First, 
they are non-spontaneous, since they are determined by an administrative agency. Second, 
they have a strong transnational dimension: austerity intensifies resource scarcity and ESF 
conditionality increases administrative requirements. Both of these conditions could apply 
under public procurement, including public works, military contractors, IT infrastructure, 
and other health and social services. We could also observe interesting parallels in the 
global supply chains of firms in highly concentrated sectors such as automotive and 
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commercial aircraft manufacturing and with technology firms seeking monopoly by 
organizing exchange on electronic platforms.  
For purposes of our argument, we assume that the transaction organizer is interested 
in maintaining a stable organizational field among project-based organizations delivering 
the services. This is often realistic: public funders commonly pursue this goal through 
living wage ordinances or by building social and environmental standards into their 
purchasing practices (Jaehrling, 2015). Economic sociologists assume more generally that 
market participants are interested in stabilizing exchange (Ahrne et al, 2015). But this is not 
always the case: the disruptive effects of marketization in social services has been cited 
both as a danger (Greer et al 2017) and benefit (Le Grand, 2003). Where government 
funders do seek to be a stabilizing influence on organizations and employment, however, 




Ahrne, G., Aspers. P., and Brunsson, N. (2015). The organization of markets. Organization 
Studies, 36, 7-27. 
Bach, S., & Bordogna, L. (2013). Reframing public service employment relations: the 
impact of economic crisis and the new EU economic governance. European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 19, 279-294. 
Baines, D. (2004). Caring for nothing: Work organization and unwaged labour in social 
services. Work, Employment and Society, 18, 267-295. 
Bakker, R., Boroş, S., Kenis, P., & Oerlemans, L. A. (2013). It's only temporary: time 
frame and the dynamics of creative project teams. British Journal of Management, 24, 383-
397. 
Bakker, R. M., DeFillippi, R. J., Schwab, A., & Sydow, J. (2016). Temporary organizing: 
Promises, processes, problems. Organization Studies, 37, 1703-1719. 
Bechky, B. (2006). Gaffers, gofers, and grips: Role-based coordination in temporary 
organizations. Organization Science, 17, 3-21. 
Bezes, P. and Le Lidec, P. (2011) ‘L’hybridation du modèle territorial français’, Revue 
française d’administration publique, 136, 919–42. 
Blyth, M. (2013). Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea. Oxford University Press. 
 
Bohle, D. and Greskovits, B. (2012). Capitalist diversity on Europe's periphery. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Bubbico, R. and De Michelis M. (2011). The financial execution of the cohesion funds. 
Regional focus, 3. 
Brodkin, E. Z. (2008). Accountability in street-level organizations. International Journal of 
Public Administration, 31, 317-336. 
Christopherson, S. (2002). Project work in context: regulatory change and the new 
geography of media. Environment and Planning A, 34, 2003-2015. 
 55 
 
Commission, European (2014), 'A map of social enterprises and their ecosystems in 
Europe', 
(http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=2149&furtherNews=ye
s: European commission). 
Cunningham, I., & Nickson, D. (2011). A gathering storm: re-tendering and the voluntary 
sector workforce. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 24, 662-672. 
Dille, T., & Söderlund, J. (2011). Managing inter-institutional projects: The significance of 
isochronism, timing norms and temporal misfits. International Journal of Project 
Management, 29(4), 480-490. 
 
Doellgast, V., Lillie, N., & Pulignano, V. (Eds.). (2018). Reconstructing solidarity: Labour 
unions, precarious work, and the politics of institutional change in Europe. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Dörrenbächer, N. (2017). Europe at the frontline: analysing street-level motivations for the 
use of European Union migration law. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-20. 
Ferge, Z. (2000). 'Social security reform: is it a different issue for accession countries? 
(draft)', Paper prepared for the conference organised by CEPII (Paris) and CEPS (Brussels) 
on the Economic and Social Dimensions of EU Enlargement. Brussels, 16 November 2000. 
Finn, D. (2015). Welfare to work devolution in England. Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Fretel, A. (2008). L'association comme réponse à la question sociale du XIXe au XXe 
siècle: d'un registre libéral à l'alliance à l'Etat social. Revue de la régulation. Capitalisme, 
institutions, pouvoirs, 2, 1-22. 
Gerven, M., Vanhercke, B., & Gürocak, S. (2014). Policy learning, aid conditionality or 
domestic politics? The Europeanization of Dutch and Spanish activation policies through 
the European Social Fund. Journal of European public policy, 21, 509-527. 
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (2017). Discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for 
qualitative research. London: Routledge. 
Grabher, G. (2004). Temporary architectures of learning: Knowledge governance in project 
ecologies. Organization studies, 25, 1491-1514. 
 56 
 
Greer, I. and Doellgast, V. (2017). Marketization, inequality, and institutional change. 
Toward a new framework for comparative employment relations. Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 59, 192-208. 
Greer, I., Breidahl, N. K., Larsen, F., & Knuth, M. (2017). The Marketization of 
Employment Services: The Dilemmas of Europe's Work-First Welfare State. Oxford 
University Press. 
Greer, I., Schulte, L., and Symon, G. (forthcoming). Creaming and parking in marketised 
employment services. An Anglo-German comparison. Human Relations. 
Godenhjelm, S., Lundin, R. A., & Sjöblom, S. (2015). Projectification in the public sector–
the case of the European Union. International Journal of Managing Projects in Business, 8, 
324-348. 
Heyes, J. and Lewis, P. (2015). Relied upon for the heavy lifting: can employment 
protection legislation reforms lead the EU out of the jobs crisis? Industrial Relations 
Journal, 46, 81-99. 
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-level governance and European integration. 
Rowman & Littlefield. 
Huguenot-Noël, R., Hunter, A., & Zuleeg, F. (2017). Can the EU structural funds reconcile 
growth, solidarity and stability objectives? A study on the role of conditionalities in 
spurring structural reforms and reducing macroeconomic imbalances. EPC Issue Paper No. 
83, October 2017. 
Jantz, B., Klenk, T., Larsen, F., & Wiggan, J. (2015). Marketization and varieties of 
accountability relationships in employment services: Comparing Denmark, Germany, and 
Great Britain. Administration & Society, 50, 321–345 
Jaehrling, K. (2015). The state as a ‘socially responsible customer’? Public procurement 
between market-making and market-embedding. European Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 21, 149-164. 
Kalleberg, A. L. (2009). Precarious work, insecure workers: Employment relations in 
transition. American sociological review, 74, 1-22. 
 57 
 
Karmowska, J., Child, J., & James, P. (2017). A contingency analysis of precarious 
organizational temporariness. British Journal of Management, 28, 213-230. 
Keune, M. and Payton, N. (2017). Active Inclusion at the European Level: Actors, 
Discourses and Policies. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies. 
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: Scientific 
inference in qualitative research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Lavitry, L. (2015). Flexibilité des chômeurs, mode d'emploi: les conseillers à l'emploi à 
l'épreuve de l'activation. Paris: PUF. 
Lebar, L, et al. (2014). Evalvacija programa Spodbujanje neaktivnih oseb, ki so dalj časa 
oddaljene od trga dela, za njihovo vrnitev oziroma ponovni vstop na trg dela s poglobljeno 
individualno in skupinsko obravnavo. Ljubljana: NISV. 
Lipsky, M. (1980). Street level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public 
services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Ligthart, R., Oerlemans, L., & Noorderhaven, N. (2016). In the shadows of time: A case 
study of flexibility behaviors in an interorganizational project. Organization Studies, 37, 
1721-1743. 
Lundin, R. A., Arvidsson, N., Brady, T., Ekstedt, E., & Midler, C. (2015). Managing and 
working in project society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Marchington, M., Grimshaw, D., Rubery, J. and Willmott, H. (2005) Fragmenting Work: 
Blurring Organizational Boundaries and Disordering Hierarchies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Midler, C. (1995). “Projectification” of the firm: the Renault case. Scandinavian Journal of 
Management, 11(4), 363-375. 
 
Munck af Rosenschöld, J., & Wolf, S. (2017). Toward projectified environmental 
governance? Environment and Planning A, 49, 273-292. 
 58 
 
Müller, R., Pemsel, S., & Shao, J. (2014). Organizational enablers for governance and 
governmentality of projects: A literature review. International Journal of Project 
Management, 32, 1309-1320. 
 
Novak, M. and Rihar-Bajuk, K. (2007). Slovenia, in Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs (eds.), 
Social policy and international interventions in South East Europe. London: Edward Elgar, 
45-61. 
Palier, B. (2010). A long goodbye to Bismarck? The politics of welfare reform in 
continental Europe. Amsterdam University Press. 
Peticca-Harris, A., Weststar, J., & McKenna, S. (2015). The perils of project-based work: 
Attempting resistance to extreme work practices in video game development. Organization, 
22, 570-587. 
Ranald, P. (2002). Where are the jobs in the job network? Competitive tendering of 
employment services, in Peter Fairbrother, Michael Paddon, and Julian Teicher (eds.) 
Privatisation, Globalisation and Labour (Federation Press), 158-181. 
Rothstein, B. (1998). Just institutions matter: the moral and political logic of the universal 
welfare state. Cambridge University Press. 
Samaluk, B (2017). Austerity stabilised through European funds: the impact on Slovenian 
welfare administration and provision. Industrial Relations Journal, 48, 56-71. 
Schulte, L., Umney, C., Greer, I., Iankova, K., & Symon, G. (forthcoming). Insertion as an 
alternative to workfare: Active labour market schemes in the Parisian suburbs. Journal of 
European Social Policy. 
Smolej-Jež, S., et al. (2017), 'Spremljanje izvajanja programov socialnega varstva (za leto 
2016)', (Ljubljana: ISV). 
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1959). Bureaucratic and craft administration of production: A 
comparative study. Administrative science quarterly, 4, 168-187. 
Sydow, J., Lindkvist, L., and DeFillippi. R. (2004) Project-based organizations, 
embeddedness and repositories of knowledge. Organization Studies, 25, 1475-1489. 
 59 
 
Trbanc, M. (2015), 'Podlage za pripravo in zagon programov socialne aktivacije', 
(Ljubljana: Inštitut Republike Slovenije za socialno varstvo). 
Umney, C., Greer, I., Onaran, Ö. and Umney, C. (Forthcoming). The state and class 
discipline: European labour market policy after the financial crisis. Capital and Class. 
Van Gestel, N and Hillebrand, B (2011) ‘Explaining stability and change: the rise and fall 
of logics in pluralistic fields’ Organization Studies 32: 231-252 
Verschraegen, G., Vanhercke, B., & Verpoorten, R. (2011). The European Social Fund and 
domestic activation policies: Europeanization mechanisms. Journal of European Social 
Policy, 21, 55-72. 
Whitley, R. (2006). Project-based firms: new organizational form or variations on a 
theme?. Industrial and corporate change, 15, 77-99. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, markets, 
relational Contracting. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Zaviršek, D. (2008) Engendering social work education under state socialism in 
Yugoslavia, British Journal of Social Work, 38, 734-50. 
Zeitlin, J., & Vanhercke, B. (2017). Socializing the European Semester: EU social and 
economic policy co-ordination in crisis and beyond. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-
26. 
Zimmermann, K. (2016). Local Responses to the European Social Fund: A Cross‐City 





Table 1. Interviews and interviewees 









3. 1. 03/2012 
4. 2. 12/2016* (follow-up with policymaker 1) 
5. 3. 06/2012* 










    
 






    
9. Management  
10.   1. 05/2014 NGO 
11.   2. 06/2014 NGO 
12.   3. 05/2014 NGO 
13.   4. 06/2014 NGO 
14.   5. 07/2014 Public sector 
15.   6. 10/2015 Public sector 
16.  
17. Workers  
18.   7. 05/2014* NGO 
19.   8. 05/2014 Public sector 
20.   9.- 06/2014 NGO  
  10. 06/2014 NGO 
21.   11. 10/2015 Public sector 
22.  
23. Worker and manager  
  12. 05/2014* NGO 
  13. 10/2015** Public sector 
 
Managers  
  1. 04/2012 NGO 
  2. 01/2015 Public sector 
  3.-4.  01/2015 NGO 
 
Workers  
  5. 05/2011 Private sector 
  6.-7. 03/2012 Private sector  
  8. 05/2012** Public sector 
  9. 05/2012* Public sector 
  10. 03/2015* Public sector 
  11.-14. 03/2015 NGO 
  15.-17. 04/2015 NGO 
 
Workers and managers 
24.   18. 03/2012* Private sector 
25. Other Trade unionists  
  1. 06/2015*  
  2. 08/2015  
  3. 09/2015*  
  4. 09/2015  
  5 10/2015  
26. NGO umbrella 05/2014 
27. Social work student 05/2015 
European Commission 06/2015 
28. Social movement activist 10/2015 
30. Academics 1.-3. 12/2011 
31. Business association 04/2012 
32. NGO umbrellas 1. 04/2012  





35. Total 36. 36 interviewees, 27 interviews 37. 36 interviewees, 28 interviews 
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Shared characteristics ESF funding for ‘active inclusion’ projects 
Bismarck-style welfare state  
Austerity pressures, EU macro-level governance 
 
Capacity of manage 
transaction  
High  Low  
Experience with EU funding High Low 





Comparatively high and stable 
Yes 
Shift to insecurity 
Occupational status of front-
line workers 
 
Comparatively high and stable Downgrading 
   
 
 
 
